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Abstract. The fundamental knowledge on neutrinos acquired in the recent years open the 
possibility of applied neutrino physics. Among it the automatic and non intrusive monitoring of 
nuclear reactor by its antineutrino signal could be very valuable to IAEA in charge of the 
control of nuclear power plants. Several efforts worldwide have already started. 
1.  IAEA interest 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the United Nations agency in charge of the 
development of peaceful use of atomic energy. In particular IAEA is the verification authority of the 
Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). To do that jobs inspections of civil nuclear 
installations and related facilities under safeguards agreements are made in more than 140 states. 
IAEA uses many different tools for these verifications, like neutron monitor, gamma spectroscopy, but 
also book keeping of the fuel element composition before and after their use in the nuclear power 
station. In particular it verify that weapon-origin and other fissile materials that Russia and USA have 
released from their defence programmes are used for civil application. 
Looking for innovative methods, the IAEA ask members states to make a feasibility study to 
determine whether antineutrino detection methods might provide practical safeguards tools for 
selected applications. If this method proves to be useful, IAEA has the power to decide that any new 
nuclear power plants built has to include an antineutrino monitor. 
2.  Physic basis 
In a new reactor with normal water the initial fuel consist of enriched uranium rods, with an 235U 
content typically at 3.5%, the rest is 238U. As soon as the reactor is operating, reactions of neutron 
capture on 238U produce 239Pu (and 241Pu), which then contribute also to the energy production. 
Nevertheless the net balance in plutonium is positive and a standard pressurized water power reactor 
produces around 200 kg of plutonium per year. 
Every fission of a fissile isotope produce two fissions fragments of unequal masses. The 
distribution of the lightest fragment is centred around A = 94 for fission of 235U, and centred around A 
= 102 in the case of 239Pu. All these nuclei, too rich in neutrons, are extremely unstable and thus beta 
decay toward stable nuclei with an average of 6 ß decays and thus with 6 antineutrinos. In these 
processes several hundreds of unstable nuclei, with their excited states are involved, which makes very 
difficult to understand details of the physics; moreover, the most energetic antineutrinos, which are 
detected more easily by the neutrinos detectors, are produced in the very first decays, involving nuclei 
with typical lifetime much smaller than a second. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
235U 239Pu 
released energy per fission 201.7 MeV 210.0 MeV 
Mean energy of ν 2.94 MeV 2.84 MeV 
ν per fission > 1.8 MeV 1.92 1.45 
average inter. cross section ≈ 3.2 10
-43
 
cm2 
≈ 2.76 10-43 
cm2 
Table. Main characteristics of antineutrinos originating from 235U and 239Pu fission 
Nevertheless based on predicted and observed ß spectra, the number of antineutrinos per fission 
from 239Pu is known to be less than the number from 235U, and the energy released bigger by 5%. 
Hence an hypothetical reactor able to use only 235U would induce in a detector an antineutrino signal 
60% higher than the same reactor producing the same amount of energy but burning only 239Pu (see 
table 1). This sizeable difference offer a handle to monitor changes in the relative amounts of 235U and 
239Pu in the core. Merged with the high penetration power of antineutrinos, this provide a new mean to 
make remote, nonintrusive measurements of plutonium content in reactors [1]. 
In most of the presently considered detectors, antineutrinos are detected via the inverse beta decay 
process on quasi-free protons in hydrogenous scintilla tor: ν e + p → e
+ + n  νe, with a threshold at 
1.8 MeV. The positron and the neutron are detected in a delayed coincidence, allowing strong 
rejection of the much more frequent singles backgrounds due to natural radioactivity. 
Because the antineutrino signal from the reactor decreases as the square of the distance from the 
reactor to the detector a precise "remote" measurement is really only practical at distances of a few 
tens of meters if one is constrained to "small" detectors of the order of few cubic meter in size. 
3.  Pioneers in Kurchatov 
The potentiality to address certain safeguards applications was recognized long time ago by Mikaelian 
et al. [2]. The correlation of the antineutrino signal with the thermal power and the burn-up was 
demonstrated by the Bugey [3] and Rovno experiments [4]. What makes this old idea possible today is 
our present understanding of the oscillation mechanism which guarantee that the signal recorded by a 
neutrino detector at less than 200 meters from a reactor is not significantly affected, or could be 
corrected for. In this respect the results of KamLAND detector [5] as a global monitor of remote ≈ 
180 km) power plants is impressive. 
4.  Efforts in the USA 
The experimental program for development of nonproliferation detectors in the United States is led by 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratories. The LLNL/SNL work 
has consisted of installing and operating a prototype detector at the 3.46 GWth San Onofre Nuclear 
Generating Station (SONGS) in Southern California. The detector [6], now operating at SONGS at a 
distance of 24.5 meters from the core in the tendon gallery (fig. 1a), and with an overburden of about 
25 m.w.e., is shown in figure 1b. The shielding consists of a muon veto system for rejecting cosmic 
ray backgrounds, a water/polyethylene shield to reject neutron and gamma backgrounds. The central 
detector, which registers antineutrino interactions, has a one cubic meter active liquid scintillator 
doped with gadolinium (0.64 ± 0.06 ton), seen by eight 9” PMTs. The overall footprint including 
shielding is 2.5 meter × 3 meter. 
In this condition the rate predicted at the beginning of the reactor fuel cycle is approximately 3800 
± 440 antineutrino interactions per day for a perfectly efficient detector. The overall efficiency to 
detect antineutrino interaction via positron neutron delayed coincidence is 10.7% with a signal to 
background close to 4. The number of antineutrino events observed, 459 ± 16/day is in good 
agreement with the expected rate deduced from simulation. 
Changes in reactor power can quickly (within a few hours) be detected by tracking the antineutrino 
rate. The plot of daily rate versus time (Figure 2) also shows a two sigma deviation of the antineutrino 
rate from a constant value over a six month period, with the linear reduction in total rate consistent 
  
 
 
 
 
with a prediction that includes a fuel burn up estimate. Current effort is focused on confirming the 
indications of fuel burn up seen in this data. Already these results, although modest for neutrino 
specialists, are convincing enough for external viewers which correlate usually a neutrino detector 
with a huge apparatus. 
 
 
Figure 1. The SONGS detector (right) located in the tendon gallery (left) 
 
Figure 2. The impact of the refueling is clearly seen on the antineutrino record 
5.  Efforts in France 
The Double Chooz collaboration, an experiment [7] mainly devoted to study the fundamental 
properties of neutrinos, is also in a good position to evaluate the interest of using antineutrino 
detection to remotely monitor nuclear power station. Indeed, without any extra experimental effort, the 
near detector of the Double Chooz experiment will provide the most important data set of antineutrino 
detected (5x105 ν per year). The precise energy spectrum recorded at a given time will be correlated to 
the fuel composition and to the thermal power provided by EDF; it is expected that individual 
component due to fissile element (235U, 239Pu) could be extracted with some modest precision and 
serve as a benchmark of this techniques. 
5.1.  Toward a better understanding of the antineutrino spectrum 
The IAEA recommends the study of specific safeguards scenarios. Among its concerns are the 
confirmation of the absence of unrecorded production of fissile material in declared reactors and the 
monitoring of the burn-up of a reactor core. The time required to manufacture an actual weapon 
estimated by the IAEA (conversion time), for plutonium in partially irradiated or spent fuel, lies 
between 1 and 3 months. The significant quantity of plutonium is 8 kg, to be compared with the 3 tons 
of 235U contained in a Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) of power 900MWe enriched to 3%. The 
small magnitude of the expected signal requires a careful feasibility study. 
  
 
 
 
 
The proliferation scenarios of interest involve different kinds of nuclear power plants such as light 
water or heavy water reactors (PWR, BWR, Candu...), it has to include isotope production reactors of 
a few tens of MWth, and future reactors (e.g., PBMRs, Gen IV reactors, accelerator-driven sub-critical 
assemblies for transmutation, molten salt reactors). To perform these studies, core simulations with 
dedicated Monte-Carlo codes are being developed in France. The particle transport code MCNPX 
coupled with an evolution code solving the Bateman equations for the fission products are combined 
within a package called MURE (MCNP Utility for Reactor Evolution) [8]. It computes accurately the 
amount of all β- emitters produced during the operation of a nuclear power plant. 
To fulfil the goal of nonproliferation, additional laboratory tests and theoretical calculations should 
also be performed to more precisely estimate the underlying neutrino spectra of plutonium and 
uranium fission products, especially at high energies. As concluded by P. Huber and Th. Schwetz [9] 
to achieve this goal a reduction of the present errors on the antineutrino fluxes of about a factor of 
three is necessary. This is the basis to the important effort to better understand the antineutrino 
spectrum. More details can be found in S. Cormon contribution [10]. 
A careful evaluation and propagation of all sources of error is under study in french groups. When 
building the total spectra, experimental data on the energy and spin and parity of all known nuclear 
levels are used to determine the shape and error of individual β-branches. In the case of nonunique 
forbidden β transition, different levels of approximation are used to parameterize the spectrum shape. 
When computing the amount of β-emitters present in the reactor core at a given time, the effect of the 
uncertainty on fission yields can be estimated numerically via a limited number of MURE simulations. 
 
Figure 3. Comparison (Preliminary) with the simulation (shaded area) and Schreckenbach’s data [11] 
for electrons and antineutrino 
Thanks to the description of each single β-branch, no extra error is involved when converting the 
electron total spectrum to an antineutrino spectrum. Once a final error is quoted in each 100 keV bin, 
this method will allow quantifying for the first time the sensitivity of the neutrino probe to the isotopic 
composition of the reactor core, that is what minimum change of the 235U/239Pu ratio is detectable. 
Uncertainties in the normalization and the large amount of common nuclei in the 235U and 239Pu decay 
chains induce large error correlations, which, if treated properly, will increase the sensitivity of the 
neutrino probe when comparing two spectra. 
This promising study will also provide the error budget for an independent measurement of the 
total nuclear power released by the core. In the low energy part of the spectrum (<4 MeV) one expects 
the final accuracy to be high enough to provide useful constraints on the total spectrum shape for the 
neutrino oscillation analysis. At higher energy these simulations can tag few critical poorly known 
isotopes and trigger an experimental program in order to complete the existing databases. 
Finally, the computed energy spectrum of antineutrino can be coupled to a detailed GEANT4 
simulation of the Double-Chooz detector or of a small prototype antineutrino detector. 
6.  Toward a prototype of neutrino monitor 
  
 
 
 
 
If we want to propose to the IAEA a neutrino detector able to help in monitoring future nuclear power 
plants, the next step in this effort has to merge the two present experimental approaches: the Double 
Chooz approach with a good energy measurement, a good signal to noise ratio, but expensive and 
sophisticated; and the SONGS approach with a robust, simple, automatic, cheap, but with poor 
antineutrino detection efficiency, a modest signal to background ratio, and poor energy resolution. We 
thus are considering a new prototype with a size small enough to be installed very close to the reactor 
core (30 meters or so), but using a technique able to clearly sign antineutrinos. Such a prototype will 
be considered as a demonstrator to be shown to the IAEA and at the same time it is already usable tool 
to measure the thermal power. 
As an intermediate goal, we can foresee measurements with this prototype at ILL with its core of 
roughly pure 235U. It would allow the recording of a very pure neutrino signal from 235U fission only 
followed by the evolution due to burn-up. Such a clean experiment would help to calibrate the 
neutrino signal versus the thermal power, and will also give some confidence for the simulation effort. 
A brazilian team is currently developing an antineutrino detector to be installed in the close vicinity 
of a new power plant in Angra [12]. This detector will be used to monitor the reactor activity, and to 
provide an additional tool on verification of safeguards on Nonproliferation. The planned turnon dates 
are 2008 for the very near detector and 2013 for the Angra complete configuration. 
7.  Distant monitoring 
Neutrinos travels long distance through dense materials without being stopped. Hence it forbids to 
totally hide some nuclear activities involving fission like a clandestine nuclear power or nuclear test. 
Moreover, in the case of a test, the unique signature given by the antineutrino interaction, in 
coincidence with other methods like seismic waves, transform an hint into a proof. 
Based on this principal several groups around the world propose network of huge detectors able to 
detect, locate and measure the power of nuclear reactors and of bombs test. In the mean time a more 
modest neutrino detector used in coincidence with the standard seismic network could sign 
unambiguously the real nature of a kton test. This aspect of the use of antineutrinos was covered in the 
previous proceeding of Neutrino 04 [13] and was the subject of a dedicated workshop [14]. In this 
approach HanoHano is a good example of such detector [15]. 
8.  Neutrinos for Peace 
All the applications of our knowledge of neutrinos seems surprising for physicists which, for many 
years, consider this particle as the most elusive one. It is remarquable that so quickly a very 
fundamental research could turn into applications: it is even more enjoyable that the first applications 
envisaged for this unusual particle is the control of arm races and not a new weapon. For all these 
reasons, I would gladly propose to name these worldwide efforts: Neutrinos for Peace. 
References. 
[1] A. Bernstein, et. al., J. Appl. Phys. 91 (2002) 4672 
[2] Mikaelian L.A., Proc. Int. Conference Neutrino-77, v. 2, p. 383-387 
[3] Y. Declais et al., Nucl. Phys. B434 (1995) 503 
[4] Yu. V. Klimov, et. al., Atomic Energy, 76 (1994) 123 
[5] K. Eguchi et al., KamLAND Collab., Phys. Rev. Lett. 90 (2003) 021802 
[6] N.S. Bowden et al., ArXiv:physics/0612152 
[7] F. Ardellier et al., ArXiv:hep-ex/0606025 
[8] Mal'plan O. et al. In Proceedings of the ENC 2005 (CD-Rom) (2005) 1-7. 
[9] P. Huber, Th. Schwetz, Phys.Rev. D70 (2004) 053011 
[10] S. Cormon et al., these Proceedings 
[11] K. Schreckenbach et al., Phys. Lett. B160 (1985) 325 
[12] J.C. Anjos et al., Nucl.Phys.Proc.Suppl.155:231-232,2006. ; ArXiv: hep-ex/0511059 
[13] J.C. Learned, Nucl. Phys. B (Proc. Suppl.) 143 (2005) 152-156 
  
 
 
 
 
[14] Neutrino Science 2005, http://www.phys.hawaii.edu/~sdye/hnsc.html 
[15] S. Dye, ArXiv:hep-ex/0611039 
